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Abstract
Strengthening executive constraints is one of the key means of improving political gover-
nance. This paper argues that resilient leaders who face a lower probability of being replaced
are less likely to reform institutions in the direction of constraining executive power. We test
this idea empirically using data on leaders since 1875 using two proxies of resilience: whether
a leader survives to die in o¢ ce and whether recent natural disasters occur during the leaders
tenure. We show that both are associated with lower rates of leader turnover and a lower
probability of a transition to strong executive constraints. This e¤ect is robust across a
wide range of specications. Moreover, in line with the theory, it is specic to strengthening
executive constraints rather than generalized political reform.
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1 Introduction
Creating stable systems of government where citizens enjoy political rights and rulers are con-
strained has been a major achievement in human history. Figure 1 gives a birds eye view of
this achievement by plotting the worldwide prevalence of strong executive constraints, which cir-
cumscribe the power of leaders in o¢ ce, using data from Polity IV.1 The red line illustrates this
evolution across the 50 countries for which we have uninterrupted data from 1875 to 2004. The
main variations broadly follow Huntingtons three waves of democratization (Huntington, 1991).
They reect reforms in Europe at the beginning of the past century, a setback in the interwar
period, followed by a return of high constraints after World War II, and then a surge of institu-
tional reforms in Latin America and the former Communist block from the 1980s onward. The
blue line shows the prevalence for all countries with available data.2 Although the proportion of
countries with strong executive constraints is considerably lower at the end of the sample in this
larger group, the pattern looks broadly similar, with the exception of an additional dip from 1960
to 1975 driven by a number of newly established countries (mainly former colonies).
The reasons for the adoption of such constraints are not well understood. However, leaders
who are secure in their hold on power will typically have weak motives to pursue reforms that
limit their discretionary authority. This pattern has indeed been common among monarchs and
autocrats with few or no formal checks on their power. In one of the most famous historical
examples, King John felt compelled to sign Magna Carta in 1215, but only when his power was
threatened by the barons on whom he relied for support. This episode suggests a more general
and compelling argument: leaders with strong survival prospects are less likely to accept reforms
which constrain executive authority. We refer to such leaders as having high resilience.
Against this background, our paper studies how resilient leaders may constitute a barrier
to reform towards strong executive constraints theoretically and empirically. We formulate a
simple model, which predicts that leader resilience reduces the incentive to adopt strong executive
constraints by reducing the prospect that a ruling group loses o¢ ce.3 This component from
the theory receives support from a rst pass at the data. Raw leadership turnover is positively
correlated with the adoption of stronger executive constraints. Conditional on country and year
xed e¤ects, such reforms are about 9 percentage points more likely in the ve years after a
leadership transition than in the ve years before the transition, a di¤erence which is statistically
signicant. But more satisfactory evidence for our general idea requires more exogenous measures
of leader resilience.
What makes political leaders resilient? Understanding this in detail would require a host of
detailed case-by-case investigations based on political biographies and country-specic analyses.
In Section 2, we present three such case studies. More generally, a key property of a resilient leader
that may shape his/her propensity for reform is his/her prospective political longevity. Such
resilience could be rooted in hard-to-measure individual characteristics, such as robust health,
charisma, having the right connections or a ruthless willingness to eliminate political opponents.
But resilience could also be the result of matching, i.e., the leader has the right characteristics
needed to meet the salient policy challenges in a particular country and time. Thus, a leader who
has guided a country through di¢ cult times e.g., when a natural disaster has struck may be
viewed favorably by the citizens.
But resilience is notoriously hard to predict. Having led the country through the Falklands
1The precise data and measure underlying the gure is discussed in Section 4.1.
2This lessens the possibility of survivorshipbias, i.e. looking only at countries that have been around for long
time.
3This argument applies specically to this aspect of institutional reform rather than to the change in overall
democracy score which typically includes openness of access to power.
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war, even the longest serving British prime minister of the twentieth century, Margaret Thatcher,
was removed from o¢ ce by her own party after large public opposition over the new Community
Charge (poll tax). Having led Zimbabwes independence movement, Robert Mugabe has survived
as a leader and seems destined to die in o¢ ce. Mugabes political cunning and ruthlessness in
repressing the opposition has made his position apparently unassailable. However, in an almost
similar position, the deteriorating health of Cubas revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro, forced him
to hand over power to his brother Raul.
Given the idiosyncratic nature of resilience, a systematic quantitative analysis can at best
look for observable determinants that are plausible correlates of realized tenure. Our strategy in
this paper thus builds on two di¤erent measures of leader resilience. The rst measure relies on
observing which leaders die in o¢ ce by natural causes. Arguably, leaders who hold on to power
until they die are inherently more resilient in the sense of our main idea. Moreover, we show that
the tenure of such leaders is much longer than for other leaders in our full sample, they stay in
o¢ ce four years longer.4 Institutional reform when a resilient leader leaves o¢ ce then reects the
di¢ culty an incumbent elite group may have in nding an equally resilient successor, a di¢ culty
that reduces the groups probability of remaining in power.
Our second resilience measure is based on events during the leaders tenure. It is motivated
by the famous "rally-around-the-ag e¤ect", which is often associated with wars and domestic
emergencies. Famous examples in recent history include how Margaret Thatcher turned around
extremely negative polling gures when she resisted Argentinas invasion of the Falkland Islands,
and howGeorgeW. Bush gained popularity following the 9/11 attacks. Arguably, natural disasters
provide more generic, measurable and empirically robust examples of this e¤ect, as they cannot
be manipulated in the same way as foreign conicts. Indeed, a key nding of the paper is that
natural disasters are robustly negatively correlated with political turnover. That is, leaders in
o¢ ce after such events tend to survive longer: in our interpretation they become more resilient
in the wake of natural disasters.
Our paper speaks to debates about the link between democracy and development. Early
studies were inuenced by the modernization hypothesis of Lipset (1959), with more recent in-
carnations being Przeworski et al (2000) and Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003). However, the
hypothesis that income drives democracy receives weak empirical support with, at best, ambigu-
ous evidence see, for example, Barro (1999), Acemoglu et al (2008), and Bruckner and Ciccione
(2011). This nding is consistent with our approach. The timing of political change is often idio-
syncratic and linked to political circumstance rather than to slow moving variables like income or
education, even though these variables may shape the wider context and citizensaspirations.
By focusing on characteristics of leaders, our approach is distinct from a strand of literature
on how social and cultural factors may promote democracy. This includes the ideas that having a
strong and e¤ective middle class or plentiful social capital may be important, as hypothesized, for
example, by Almond and Verba (1963), Moore (1966), and Putnam (1993). In this general vein,
Persson and Tabellini (2009) introduce the concept of democratic capital and nd empirically
that this consolidates rather than promotes transitions into democracy.
The ambition of our paper is to study a specic dimension of political reform. Although we
focus on strengthening executive constraints, our strategic approach to reform has much in com-
mon with the literature on franchise extension, particularly the work by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2006) on top of theory, they also o¤er useful case-study evidence. Like us, they emphasize
the role of political instability, particularly the threat of a revolution. Franchise extension is used
4Using this source of variation to study outcomes follows Jones and Olken (2005), but the interpretation is
di¤erent. In this paper, leaders who die in o¢ ce are viewed as having a specic trait resilience consistent with
their longer average tenure. It is not their death per se that matters, but the fact that the new leader (or the
leader previous to the one dying in o¢ ce) may not be equally resilient.
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a commitment device by the elite to guarantee more favorable treatment of the masses. Aidt
and Jensen (2010) nd econometric evidence in support of this view. Below, we show that our
two resilience measures do not predict changes in the franchise, nor other moves towards greater
openness.
Our argument is also related to that in Lizzeri and Persico (2004), where a ruling group
voluntarily extends the franchise to reorient spending from transfers targeted to small groups to
broad-based programs. It also resembles a classic argument rst made by Rokkan (1970) and
extended by Boix (1999). This holds that fears of electoral losses explain the move from plurality
to proportional representation as a means of protecting the center-right from a labor electoral
landslide in those countries in early 20th-century Europe where landed and industrial elites had
not forged their interests.
In a di¤erent vein, Laguno¤ (2001) develops a model with a dynamic game between two
groups, in which greater political turnover leads to greater constitutional support for civil liberties.
Congleton (2007) discusses forces that promote the introduction of parliamentary oversight on
royal power, focusing on instability due to preference shocks to the monarch. Acemoglu, Robinson
and Torvik (2011) develop a model of endogenous checks and balances, stressing the way that
these change the ability of special interests to inuence policy. Jones and Olken (2009) exploit
the di¤erence between successful and unsuccessful assassination attempts to show that random
leadership change leads to democratic reform, as measured by a broad democracy index.
In summary, our approach is one where institutional reform is defensive and undertaken
by a leader or his group in the anticipation of losing political power. This is di¤erent from the
Acemoglu-Robinson approach, where institutional reforms are also defensive, but the incumbent
group gives up political power in order to secure economic power. Our approach also di¤ers from
those based on revolutionary change, where institutional change is o¤ensiveand an incumbent
is removed from power as a means of securing political change. Of course, all these approaches
have their counterparts in the real world. Our aim is to explore the theoretical and empirical
validity of one particular approach, rather than trying to provide a general account of all aspects
of institutional change.
In the next section of the paper, we set the stage by discussing three case-studies, for Spain,
Nigeria and Taiwan. These cases illustrate how political reforms were rst resisted by resilient
leaders but implemented once the resilient leaders had left o¢ ce. They also discuss the sources
of power that made each leader resilient during his lifetime.
Section 3 develops a simple innite-horizon model, where an incumbent group that faces high
expected turnover may choose to reform by putting in place more binding executive constraints.
Given that leaders have di¤erent survival probabilities, the model makes a specic empirical
prediction: leaders with greater resilience and hence lower expected turnover are less likely to
carry out reforms towards stronger executive constraints.
In Section 4, we discuss how to take the model to the data. The model suggests a reduced-
form relation, where the probability of a transitions to/from weak executive constraints depends
on leader resilience. As already mentioned, we measure resilience in two ways: whether a leader
(eventually) dies in o¢ ce from natural causes, and whether s/he experiences a natural disaster
while in o¢ ce. Underlying this reduced form, are two equations: one representing the impact of
resilience on turnover and the other relating institutional change to turnover. We explore both
correlations in the data.
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Our baseline estimates are consistent with the pre-
dictions of the model. They suggest that having a leader who later dies in o¢ ce and/or has
experienced a natural disaster in the last two years in o¢ ce lowers the probability of a transition
from weak to strong executive constraints by about 3-5 percentage points per year. While we see
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similar reductions in turnover with more resilient leaders in countries which already have strong
executive constraints, there is no systematic relation of the kind implied by the theory between
lower turnover and switches towards weak executive constraints. Our main nding is thus asym-
metric. We show that these results are robust to a number of concerns e.g., the results hold
up when we control for personal characteristics of leaders, as well as the economic and political
contexts at the time the leader entered into o¢ ce.
Section 6 relates this paper to wider forms of democratic reform, specically increases in
openness like extensions of the franchise that create more contestable power structures. We
show how the model can be extend to encompass this aspect of reform. But, empirically, leader
resilience does not seem to predict reforms towards greater openness. Thus, our results are specic
to reforms of executive constraints and not driven by general democratizations.
Section 7 concludes the paper. Some details of the theory and the data are relegated to an
Appendix.
2 Country Case Studies
Francisco Franco in Spain5 Francisco Franco was an archetypal example of a resilient leader
in terms of our theory. A victorious war hero, he ruled Spain under unchecked authoritarian rule
after the end of the civil war. According to the Law of Succession from 1947, Spain would return
to monarchy, but Franco would rule for life and himself appoint the next King. The unelected
Spanish pseudo-parliament, the Cortes, was at best an advisory body with no right to initiate
legislation or oppose the government. It was dominated by the so-called National Movement 
the Movimiento which constituted the political elite. The Movimiento comprised a collection
of right-wing families and was the only recognized forum for political participation. No elections
were held during the Franco period.
Some modest reforms in 1966 separated the functions of head of state and head of government,
but the authoritarian character of the regime remained intact. Hard-line Admiral Luis Carrero
Blanco was appointed the rst prime minister and was also widely expected to become Francos
successor, even though Franco had appointed Juan Carlos as the next head of state already in 1969.
Juan Carlos, the son of Spains legitimate monarch Juan of Bourbon, was generally considered an
insider of the ruling elite, by which he had been educated and groomed. As a quid pro quo for
the appointment, Juan Carlos swore to be faithful to the National Movement. Thus, he publicly
supported the regime and took part in ceremonial functions together with Franco.
From the late 1960s, the regime saw increasing challenges from an emerging political oppo-
sition, including regional-autonomy movements in the Basque country, Catalonia, and (less so)
Galicia. In particular, ETA  the Basque revolutionary liberation army  started to system-
atically implement the theory of action/terror/action to further its independence cause. Most
signicantly, ETA assassinated Carrero Blanco in December 1973. The regime countered the op-
position with higher levels of repression. Meanwhile, the ailing Franco replaced Carrero Blanco
as Prime Minister with another hardliner, Arias Navarro. Despite the mounting opposition, there
was little to suggest an end to the unchecked authoritarian regime. For the postwar period until
the year of 1974, Polity IV sets the executive constraints variable for Spain at the bottom score
of 1 (on a scale from 1 to 7).
In November of 1975, Franco died in o¢ ce of heart disease. At this time, no similarly resilient
leader was waiting to take over. Although the Cortes proclaimed Juan Carlos King of Spain,
it rea¢ rmed Navarro as prime minister. The latter made vague proposals of limited reforms.
5This subsection is based on Conversi (2002), Encyclopedia Brittanica (2012), Fishman (1990), Linz (1990),
Linz and Stepan (1996), Polity IV (2012), Rosenfeld (1997), Share (1987), and Solsten and Meditz (1988).
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When these were met with public demonstrations, strikes and increased regional terrorist acts,
the regime responded with increased repression. Following discontent with Navarros handling of
the situation, the King asked for him to step down in the summer of 1976. He replaced Navarro
with another leading gure from the Movimiento, its general secretary and former Franco minister,
Adolfo Suarez Gonzales.
Despite expectations to the contrary, Suarez with outright support of the King saw the
need for more far-reaching reforms, to avoid descent into a spiral of repression and violence. He
soon announced plans for a comprehensive package of political reform, which would put in place
a constitutional monarchy based on parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature. In
the fall of 1976, he managed to convince the Movimiento members of the Cortes that the only
way forward was to accept this reform package, which e¤ectively would dismantle the institution
itself. Later in that fall, the Spanish people approved the plans with a majority of 88% in a
national referendum. New laws permitting political parties, including the Communist Party, were
passed by the Cortes in the spring of 1977, and a new legislature was elected by proportional
representation in the summer of the same year.
In these elections, Suarez ran as the party leader of the newly founded UCD at the conservative-
center of politics, which emerged as the largest party followed by the PSOE (the Socialist Party).
The most polarized parties, the Alianza Popular (on the far right, picking up the heritage from the
dissolved Movimiento) and the Communist Party, each polled at about 10%. The new parliament
elected a seven-member constitutional committee representing all major parties to draft Spains
new constitution. The committees proposal was amended and eventually passed by parliament
in October 1978, and approved in a general referendum in December of the same year. After this,
Suarez dissolved the parliament and called for new elections under the new constitution.
A mere three years after Francos death, Suarez and Juan Carlos, two members of the former
ruling elite, had thus led the country through a remarkably peaceful democratic transition. In
this process, Spain adopted a constitution with a number of horizontal checks and balances, as
well as provisions for regional autonomy. The new political regime has endured since those days 
its resilience was tested most dramatically in a failed coup attempt in February 1981 by Colonel
Antonio Tejero, who together with 200 armed members of the paramilitary police (the Guardia
Civil) stormed into the Chamber of Deputies to interrupt its election of the new prime minister.
From the year of 1978, Polity IV codes Spains executive constraints with the top score of 7 (on
the 1 to 7 scale).
This example illustrates two key points relevant to the paper. First, Franco faced no e¤ective
opposition while alive the fact that he died in o¢ ce is indicative of his resilience as a leader.
Second, following his departure, no comparable resilient leader was waiting in the wings. The fact
that subsequent leaders of the ruling group were likely to face a more contestable position led to
a move towards stronger executive constraints.
Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan6 Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang
Ching-kuo are also examples of resilient leaders whose hold on power limited their desire for
strong executive constraints. The historical context is important in understanding their resilience
as leaders.
Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Koumintang (KMT), led Taiwan after its retreat from mainland
China to Taiwan in 1949. The KMT government had brought with it not only a large number of
immigrants and a large bureaucracy, but also the o¢ cial constitution of the Republic of China.
Based on the political ideas of Sun Yat-sen, it had been put in place in 1946 as a compromise with
6This section is based on Constitution Writing and Conict Resolution (1999), Dagne (2002), Encyclopedia
Brittanica (2012), Polity IV Country Reports (2010), USAID (2006), and US State Department (2011)
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the Communist Party. The constitution prescribed a peculiar form of parliamentary government
encompassing an intricate system of checks and controls, where members of the National Assembly
and the legislature (Legislative Yuan) with their, de jure, extensive powers were all to be elected
in mainland China. The original mainland members of these two bodies came to hold lifelong
tenure, guaranteeing the continued dominance of the KMT. As the mainlanders began to die o¤,
however, the government began to hold occasional supplemental elections in which a few islanders
were elected.
De facto, however, large parts of the constitution were suspended as a result of the Temporary
Provisions for the Duration of Mobilization to Crush the Communist Rebellion, adopted in
1948. These provisions together with the martial law proclaimed in 1949 gave extensive powers
to the president and his government. Chiang Kai-shek resumed the presidency in 1950 which
he maintained until his death in 1978. Martial law was to remain in force for 38 years. During
this time, Taiwan was e¤ectively ruled by a resilient leader, namely a very powerful president and
government with support of the old KMT elite from the mainland and of the military. Executive
constraints are coded as 2 or 3 (out of 7) in the Polity IV data set. While Chiang Kai-sheks
death might have led to a less resilient leader taking over, the o¢ ce passed to his son Chiang
Ching-kuo, who was a natural successor and had previously served as minister of defence as well
as prime minister. Chiang Ching-kuo inherited much of the informal authority that his father
enjoyed and there is, therefore, every reason to regard him also as a resilient leader.7
In January 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo died in o¢ ce due to heart failure and hemmoraghe. His
presidential powers and chairmanship of the KMT were assumed by his protegee, Vice-President
Lee Teng-hui who arguably had a much less informal authority compared to his two predecessors
and hence was less resilient as a leader. As he assumed power, Lee who, unlike his predecessors,
was native Taiwanese was troubled by a continued domination of former mainlanders in the KMT
and political bodies, by an emerging opposition to the omnipotent KMT, and by popular demands
for o¢ cial separation and independence from mainland China. He embarked on a gradual process,
leading the KMT down a path of political reform. This process began with an ad hoc National
A¤airs conference, which came to serve as a bit of an informal extra-constitutional assembly. Only
the National Assembly could legally revise the constitution, but lacked legitimacy to do so as it
was dominated by former mainlanders and not representative of public opinion.
Under Lees leadership, Taiwans constitution was revised through a sequence of amendments
(in 1991, 1992, 1994 and 1997). The rst step in 1991 saw the National Assembly dominated by
the old KMT guard put an end to the Temporary Provisions. It also decided on ten constitutional
amendments. Half of these replaced the antiquated electoral rules i.e., that the National As-
sembly and the Legislative Yuan be entirely elected in mainland China with electoral rules for
Taiwan alone, thus making these elected bodies much more representative. Another amendment
gave the President the right to issue emergency orders, but only with ratication of the Legislative
Yuan, thus putting in place some clear executive constraints.
After this rst step, a general election was held in late 1991 to replace the whole National
Assembly. The newly elected body, which was still dominated by the KMT, met in 1992 to
discuss further amendments to the constitution and adopt 8 new articles. The most important
amendment was to introduce direct, rather than indirect, election of the president by the entire
electorate in the free area of the Republic(e¤ective from the 1996 election), while maintaining
the National Assemblys right of recall. The other features included giving the National Assembly
the power of consent for appointments of leaders and Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan (the
constitutional court). As a result of the 1991 and 1992 changes, the basic institutions for a semi-
7That said, in his very last years in o¢ ce, Chiang did start to put a political reform committee in place (in
March 1986) and lifted martial law (in July 1987).
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presidential system with clear checks on the president was now in place. From 1992 the executive
constraint score in Polity IV is lifted to a 5.
Additional reforms in 1994 and 1997 would further enhance executive constraints by securing
the independence of the members of the Judicial Yuan and introducing the right of the Legislative
Yuan to remove the prime minister by a constructive vote of condence. As per these changes,
the Polity IV executive constraint score went up to a 6 in 1997 (and subsequently to a 7 in
2004). In this reform process, Taiwan also developed from a one-party state into a multi-party
democracy, where the KMT was challenged by the Democratic Progressive Party and the New
Party (branching o¤ from the KMT).
Analogous to the Spanish case, this case illustrates how political reforms were nictitated when
two resilient leaders, who both died in o¢ ce (the two Chiangs), were replaced by a less resilient
one (Lee).
Sani Abacha in Nigeria8 In the six rst years after its independence from the United Kingdom
in 1960, Nigeria had a fragile democracy formally based on political institutions similar to those
of its former colonial power, the UK. In the wake of mounting ethnic and political tensions, the
country went through several military coups in 1966, followed by the Nigeria-Biafra civil war.
Over the next 33 years, it would be dominated by members of the military elite and was more
or less constantly under autocratic rule, except for a few brief and failed attempts at democratic
rule. Elections were held o¤ an on, but as a rule these were manipulated by incumbent leaders.
In 1993, General Sani Abacha came to power through another military coup. Abacha came
to lead Nigerias perhaps most brutal regime, which used its powers to enrich Abachas family
and close allies. He met calls for civilian and democratic rule with large doses of repression which
underpinned his resilience as a leader. Abachas government was the Provisional Ruling Council
(PRC), an elite group of military leaders that ruled by decree. Under continued pressure to imple-
ment political reforms, in October 1995 he adopted a three-year timetable for transition to civilian
rule. Abacha set up a new electoral commission to produce guidelines for the establishments of
political parties, at the same time as he dissolved existing opposition groups. State assembly and
gubernatorial sham elections were held in the spring of 1998, among the ve parties sanctioned
by the commission, and the UNCP a proxy party for the Nigerian military won large victories.
The scene seemed staged for a pseudo election to extend Abachas unchecked rule. Not only did
the military express its support for Abacha, but all ve state-recognized parties had nominated
Abacha as the single candidate for the elections to be held in October 1998. Polity IV codes
executive constraints during the Abacha period, up until 1997, at their lowest value of 1.
However, in June 1998 Abacha died in o¢ ce of a sudden heart attack. The PRC, still ruling by
decree, quickly appointed Chief of Sta¤ Abdulsalami Abubakar as Abachas successor. Abubakar
was a bit of a military intellectual, but he was denitely a member of the military elite, having
served also in the earlier regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. But he lacked Abachas resilience
as a leader, in part because he had not led the coup in 1993. Upon his appointment, Abubakar
declared that he would stick to Abachas timetable for presidential elections. He and the PRC also
released some political prisoners, including former General and President Olusegun Obasanjo.
To manys surprise, however, Abubakar went much farther. He recognized that long-term mil-
itary rule and many human-rights infringements had seriously damaged the countrys reputation
and that the resulting international sanctions damaged the economy. In August and Septem-
ber, he maneuvered the PRC into undertaking far-reaching political reforms, which dissolved the
ve Abacha-controlled parties, abolished the compromised electoral commission replacing it with
8This section is based on Constitution Writing and Conict Resolution (1999), Dagne (2002), Encyclopedia
Brittanica (2012, Polity IV (2010), USAID (2006), and US State Department (2011).
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a new one, red Abachas cabinet, and got rid of earlier decrees banning union activities and
political strikes. Abubakar announced that he was appointing a committee to oversee extensive
revisions to a proposal for a new constitution, to lay down the rules for the next civilian govern-
ment. Eventually, the PRC adopted an extensive revision of the earlier 1979 constitution in early
May 1999.
Abubakar also declared the earlier election results null and void and announced new national
elections for February of 1999. One of the newly created parties, the Peoples Democratic Party,
nominated Obasanjo as its presidential candidate and he went on to win the election by a large
margin. According to the timetable, Obasanjo entered into o¢ ce in late May 1999 under the
newly adopted constitution. While the constitution still retains strong powers in the hands of
the president, it provides for checks on those powers through a bicameral legislature that must
approve appointments and may oppose government proposals. It also gives a more important
role to the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court. Even though Nigeria has gone through
di¢ cult political times with ethnic and religious tensions and rivalry regarding oil revenues, the
new political institutions have survived to this day. As of 1999, Polity IV codes the executive
constraints variable at 5, meaning that substantial limitationson its government are in place.
Like the other two cases, Nigerian recent history illustrates how the death in o¢ ce of a resilient
leader, and his being replaced by a less resilient one, can pave the wave for extensive constitutional
reforms introducing stronger constraints on the executive.
3 Model
Our model is a threefold extension of the two-period, two-group, one-actor model sketched in
Besley and Persson (2011a, Ch. 7) to an innite-horizon, multiple-group setting, which explicitly
distinguishes groups and their leaders. The incumbent government in power decides how to deploy
a xed tax revenue between transfers and public goods, being more or less constrained by current
political institutions. In view of their prospect of surviving in o¢ ce, incumbent groups choose
executive constraints for the next period.
Basics and groups There is an innite horizon with time periods denoted by t = 1; 2; :::.
The population is normalized to unity and divided into 1
e
equal-sized groups indexed by J . The
incumbent government in period t belongs to one of these groups, which is denoted by It: The
other groups are in opposition and are indexed by the list OJt : If the incumbent government is
thrown out at the end of period t, one of the previous opposition groups is randomly chosen (with
equal probability) to be in power in period t+ 1. All decisions on behalf of the incumbent group
are taken by a leader, with characteristics described below
Income, preferences, and private consumption All individuals have an equal, exogenous
and constant (net of tax) income y: The utility function of a member of group J in period t is
linear in private and public goods
uJt = gt + x
J
t .
Variable gt is the per-capita provision of public goods by the incumbent. The value of public
goods is given by ; with 1 <  < 1
e
.
Variable xJt denotes private consumption, which depends on the status of a group. For all
opposition groups, it is given by
xJt = y + s
J
t ; J 2 OJt ;
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where sJt is a per-capita transfer payment to all group J members. For simplicity, we work with
the case sJt = st, so that all non-governing groups are treated in the same way. Any member of
the incumbent group, including the leader, has private consumption
xJt = y + bt ; J = It;
where bt are the per-capita rents, extracted by the period-t leader on behalf of his group these
rents could be generated endogenously through predatory activities, as in Besley and Persson
(2011a, Ch. 3). Thus, all members of the incumbent group get the same share of rents.
Everybody discounts the future with discount factor  2 (0; 1). There are no savings in the
model.
Government budget constraint The incumbent leader has access to some exogenous revenue
of T per group, in total amount T
e
: This income can be spent on three items: public goods in total
amount gt
e
; transfers to members of the incumbent group bt; and transfers to members of all other
groups in total amount st(1e   1);
The government budget constraint can thus be written as
T = gt + st (1  e) + ebt .
Within-group leader turnover In each period t, the incumbent group It starts out with a
specic leader in power. We use rt 1 2 [rL; rH ] to denote a leaders resilience. In the data, we
will use two variables to represent high resilience: (i) leaders who will eventually die in o¢ ce
and (ii) leaders who have recently experienced a natural disaster, both these variables predict
lower turnover. Higher resilience positively a¤ects two things: (i) the likelihood that the leader
will remain as the leader of the incumbent group, and (ii) the incumbent groups probability of
staying in power.
Let z (rt 1; t) 2 f0; 1g denote the binary event that a leader with resilience rt 1 survives as
leader of the incumbent group in period t; where  is a random shock including death. We assume
that z (rt 1; t) is increasing in r, i.e., more resilient leaders are less likely to lose the leadership
of their group.
If a leader is replaced within the incumbent group, there is a random draw from the pool
of potential leaders with mean resilience r. Thus, the evolution of expected leader resilience
conditional on  is given by:
E(rt) =

rt 1 if z (rt 1; t) = 1
r otherwise .
We use z (r) = Ev fz (r; v)g to denote expected within-group turnover for a leader of resilience r.
Turnover between groups The probability that the incumbent group remains in power until
the next period also depends on its current leader. Denoting this ex post (conditional) probability
by qt; we assume that it is simply equal to its leaders resilience:
qt = rt .
Before the realization of the random shock t; the ex ante (unconditional) probability that the
incumbent group survives in power when the resilience of the leader is rt 1 is given by
Qt = Q(rt 1) = z (rt 1) rt 1 + [1  z (rt 1)] r , (1)
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which we assume is increasing in r.9
Once the random shock, t, is realized and the resilience of the leader is determined, then the
probability that the period-t incumbent group loses his/her power at the end of the period is thus
1 qt = 1 rt: If the incumbent group loses power, each opposition group has an equal probability
to take over: If a new group enters into power, the leader of that group (with resilience drawn at
random) becomes the countrys new leader.
Political institutions Executive constraints can be strong or weak and they reect just how
badly an incumbent group can treat the other groups in the population. In terms of the model,
this constrains the rents that an incumbent group can extract at the expense of others in society.
Thus, we assume that the incumbent leader must give a xed share, 0  t  1; to every other
citizen, for any unit of rents collected by members of its own group:
st  tbt :
A higher value of parameter t representing stronger executive constraints on the incumbent
government, i.e., a form of institutional commitment. Concretely, this could represent stronger
constitutional provisions limiting executive powers, which are enforced by a legislature and/or an
independent judiciary.
To model the process of political reform, we follow the existing literature (e.g., Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006) in assuming a limited form of commitment, with political institutions chosen at
time t being binding on decisions at t+ 1 (see further discussion below).
Timing To summarize the model laid out above, each period has the following timing:
1. The polity starts period t with an inherited incumbent group It; whose leader has resilience
rt 1, and inherited executive constraints t; which bind for that period.
2. The incumbent leader chooses policy fgt; st; btg for the current period, and executive con-
straints, t+1; for the next period.
3. Nature determines the period-t political stability shock t. If the incumbent-group leader
survives, then his resilience stays constant. If not, then a fresh draw from a pool of leaders
determines rt.
4. Group It is replaced with probability 1 rt: Each opposition group have an equal probability
of taking over the executive, namely (1 rt)(e 1)
e
. If a new group takes power, the resilience
of its leader is chosen at random.
The model is recursive, which allows us to rst study period t, fgt; st; btg; taking t as given.
We then study the choice of political regime t+1; a more involved problem. We look for a Markov-
perfect equilibrium where the state variables are frt 1; tg. Given our structure, we show that the
decision over future institutions does not depend on t.10
9A su¢ cient condition for this is that:
1 >
E fzr (r; )g [r   r]
E fz (r; )g
for all r 2 [rL; r].
10In e¤ect, the problem will reduce to a static comparison of the e¤ect of . The focus on Markov perfection
rules out history-dependent strategies.
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Policy Beginning with public spending, the leader of the incumbent group in period t sets policy
to maximize the groups own utility
uIt = tgt + y + bt , (2)
subject to the constraints on rents and transfers, and the government budget constraint. Policies
do not depend on r and hence we write them solely as a function of . This recursive separability
is key to the empirical strategy that we pursue below, i.e., it is key that leader characteristics
associated with political survival are uncorrelated with policy preferences.
It is easy to see that the two constraints will all be satised with equality: in particular,
transfers to opposition group citizens are set to a minimum st = tbt: The remaining choice is
how much to spend on public goods and how much to spend on rents. As utility is linear, the
incumbent will always choose a bang-bangsolution
g^ () =

T if   1
+(1 )e
0 otherwise,
b^ () =

1
 + (1  )e

(T   g^ ()); and
bs () =  
 + (1  )e

(T   g^ ()) .
The incumbent leader either spends all available funds on public goods, or on rents to his own
group (and necessary transfers to opposition groups), depending on the existing executive con-
straints. Since 1 <  < 1
e
, by assumption, all residual spending is on public goods (rents) when
 is above (below) 1 e
(1 e) : Strong executive constraints i.e.,  2 [ 1 e(1 e) ; 1] induce equality in
outcomes in each period by guaranteeing that all spending is on public goods rather than transfers.
Choice of institutions The choice of institutions depends on ex-ante political stability, which
is fully captured by the resilience of the leader of the incumbent group, r. We can now state the
following result, which is proved in the Appendix:
Proposition 1 The choice of executive constraints depends on the probability that the incumbent
group retains power as follows:
^ (r) =
 1 e
(1 e) if Q (r)  e
0 otherwise.
Thus more resilient leaders are less likely to pick strong executive constraints.
The prediction in Proposition 1 is symmetric across the initial institutions in place at the
beginning of the period. Thus, it predicts transitions into or out of strong executive constraints
depending on the current value of leader resilience. This mirrors the reality in the data that
constraints on the executive move in both directions.
Even though we have allowed for a continuous choice of , the incumbent always pushes the
choice of institutions to one corner or another. The value 1 e
(1 e) represents the point at which
it becomes optimal to spend the whole budget on public goods, i.e., institutions are su¢ ciently
cohesive. The executive constraints needed to achieve this are lower when public goods are more
valuable ( is higher) or the incumbent group is larger (e is larger).
Although we have an innite horizon, the tradeo¤ comes down to comparing the e¤ects of
changing  on the policy in the next period, factoring in the possibility of group turnover. A
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high probability of losing o¢ ce leads incumbents to choose strong executive constraints. The
choice is governed by a simple comparison of benets and costs. The cost of strong constraints
to the incumbent group are next periods rents if it remains in o¢ ce. The benet is an assurance
that next periods spending will be on public goods if the incumbent group is ousted. Since
expected group turnover Q (r) in our model depends on the leaders resilience, this result ties the
characteristics of leaders to the choice of political institutions; a more resilient leader is less likely
to choose strong executive constraints.
Discussion of the model The model has several specic features to home in on how leader
resilience a¤ects the motive for political reform.
First, we have modeled political control as opportunities for grabbing a disproportionate share
of government revenue. But the specic way of discriminating against the rest of society is not
essential to the core argument. What we require is some policies on which there is a common
agreement, while others have benets which are particular to specic groups (as in Lizzeri and
Persico, 2004). The latter could include non-economic policies, e.g., some kinds of regulations of
rights (as in Laguno¤, 2001) or specic kinds of public spending over which preferences diverge.
This would be particularly relevant if the model were extended to allow for group heterogeneity
in preferences, creating a role for fractionalization and polarization.
Second, the turnover probability could be made endogenous by allowing the incumbent to
choose whether to repress opposition groups.11 Shocks to repression costs would then provide
another inuence on political instability as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
Third, the model does not allow for any means of disciplining incumbents beyond changing
institutions. Thus, it rules out links between political turnover and incumbent policy choices. In
a model with some form of accountability, incumbent groups could develop reputations to make
policies more cohesive. Except in extreme cases, however, this would not fully replace the role of
institutional constraints.
Fourth, a natural extension of the model would be to allow for costs of changing institutions.
The ink and papercosts of changing a constitution are probably not signicant. The appro-
priate foundations for costs beyond ink and paper are not self-evident. Perhaps constitutional
reforms create stickiness by facilitating changes in informal institutions, changing inertial norms
of behavior in the political system. Changes in norms might best be thought of as a further
state variable, similar to what Persson and Tabellini (2009) call democratic capital. Institu-
tional choices would then be conditioned on this state variable. More generally, sources of state
dependence that imply costs of institutional change would make an incumbent group weigh these
costs against the benets of reform, which could create a status-quo bias. Practically, this would
result in t+1 becoming a function of the institutions in place t. Partly to reect such concerns,
we will allow for state dependence in our empirical approach below.
Fifth, and nally, as mentioned in the introduction, reforms are defensive and anticipate the
possibility of a group losing power. However, they do not change the probability that a group
remains in o¢ ce. To introduce the latter is another natural extension of the approach and in
Section 6 we take a step in this direction by modeling the openness of access to power (such as
a widening of the franchise). That section also presents empirical results, which suggest that
contrary to the reforms of executive constraints this other aspect of political reform is not
strongly correlated with our two measures of leader resilience.
11A previous version of the paper considered a two-period version with endogenous repression. Besley and
Persson (2011a, Ch.7) includes a two-period model that also allows for the possibility of civil war.
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4 From Theory to Data
To bring the model to the data requires measurement of key variables. In this section, we discuss
how to measure these and the resulting summary statistics. We also discuss how to formulate an
econometric structure that rhymes with the predictions of our model.
4.1 Measurement
Political institutions Our core measure of strong executive constraints is derived from the
executive-constraints variable in the Polity IV data, "xconst". It is available for a large number
of countries over a long period of time, essentially since becoming an independent state (or since
the rstcoded data, in 1800). This variable takes on integer values between 1 and 7. As our core
measure, we use a binary indicator i;t which is equal to one if country i has a score greater than
or equal to 5 in year t.
We use this particular cuto¤ for two reasons. First, plotting the empirical distribution of
scores over countries and years, has a distribution with a local minimum at 4. Second, according
to the Polity IV codebook, a value of 5 is the lowest at which there are substantial limitations of
executive power, where a legislature or council often modies or defeats executive proposals,
or sometimes refused funds to the executive, and the accountability group makes important
appointments to administrative posts  see Marshall and Jaggers (2010, pp. 24-25). Using
this classication, we have 171 reforms in an unbalanced panel of 167 countries with annual
observations since 1875. This is the measure that was used to construct Figure 1. The robustness
analysis to follow shows that we get similar results when marginally altering the cuto¤ for our
binary indicator.
Leaders Since we do not observe turnover between groups in a large enough group of countries
for a long enough time, we instead focus on turnover between leaders, i.e., exits of leaders from
o¢ ce. We use several data sources for this purpose. The core data set is Archigos (Goemans,
Gledtisch and Chiozza, 2009) that documents which leaders are in o¢ ce at which dates. We
highlight a particular subset of leadership transitions, following the death or serious illness of the
incumbent leader. Here, we exploit data from Besley et al (2011), who extend the sample of Jones
and Olken (2005) with years before the second world war. The main biographical sources are
the Encyclopedia of Heads of States and Governments (Lentz, 1994, 1999) and the Encyclopedia
Britannica.
We also measure a number of other personal characteristics of leaders, including their edu-
cation, occupation, social class, and their mode of entry in power. Education and occupation
come from Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011). The sources of the social class and mode of entry
variables are given in the Data Appendix.
Resilience We measure leader resilience in two ways. The rst is an ex post measure based on
whether a leader survives to leave o¢ ce only due to natural death (or serious illness). Since 1875
just above 10 percent of all leaders 217 out of a total of 2095 left o¢ ce in this way.12 The rest
leave o¢ ce for other reasons, primarily due to electoral defeats, coups, or assassinations. Since
the leaders who die in o¢ ce have much longer tenure than other leaders, we regard the ability
to survive until a natural death as a xed-leader characteristic which proxies for resilience. For
the purposes of our analysis it does not matter whether a leader who dies from natural causes
in o¢ ces is resilient because he or she is deemed to be especially competent or because s/he has
12For a full description of these specic leadership transitions see Besley et al (2011).
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an e¤ective means of maintaining o¢ ce through a powerful personal network. Our rst measure
of resilience is thus a binary indicator in country i , pi;t 1, which is equal to one if the leader
that holds o¢ ce at the beginning of year t is someone who will eventually die in o¢ ce, and zero
otherwise. This indicator, which we refer to as personal resilience, is positively related to ri;t 1
in the model.
Our second measure of leader resilience relies on circumstances of the leaders tenure due to
unforeseen events. Specically, we rely on recent natural disasters during the leaders tenure in
o¢ ce. The underlying idea is that citizenscrave political stability and continuity in the wake
of such disasters, the so-called rally-round-the-ag e¤ect. That citizens rally around leaders in
times of national stress is a well-known idea in political science, discussed for example in Kinsella,
Russett and Star (2012, page 120). While there is some debate about the basis of this e¤ect
a deep-seated psychological response of citizens, or a rational-choice based need to maintain
stability in tough times the exact interpretation does not matter for our analysis. They key for
the approach to work is a strong enough empirical relationship between the incidence of natural
disasters and political stability.
Our data on natural disasters measure comes from the EM-DAT data set. Specically, we
dene a variable that adds together the number of such events in a given country and year.13 We
believe that these events are material enough in all cases to have a¤ected signicant fractions of
the population. Having created the number of events, we create a dummy variable, denoted by fi;t;
which is equal to one if there is any disaster in a given country and year. We will work with lagged
values, specically fi;t 1 and fi;t 2 which we refer to as rallying-around-the-ag resilience, or
"ag resilience" for short. In the same way as for pi;t 1; we postulate that these variables are
positively related to ri;t 1 in the model.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the period 1875 to 2004 for the leader-year obser-
vations that we use in the core empirical analysis below. Six columns compare mean outcomes
(by country-year) in the strong and weak executive-constraint samples. We also break it down
according to whether leaders die from natural causes in o¢ ce, our proxy for personal resilience.
Row (1) shows that among 11,005 country-years for which we have leader data, just under
two thirds feature weak executive constraints. Row (2) shows that there are more personally re-
silient leaders in weak executive-constraints country-years. Rows (3) and (4) show that personally
resilient leaders on average su¤er fewer natural disasters during their term in o¢ ce. Moreover,
row (5) shows that turnover is lower under weak executive constraints. These di¤erences indicate
that some unobserved characteristics di¤er across the two sub-samples. This possibility of state
dependence is one reason why we divide the sample according to the initial value of executive
constraints throughout the empirical analysis.
A striking fact in row (7) is that countries with personally resilient leaders have longer tenure,
something which is particularly pronounced in countries with weak executive constraints. With
weak (strong) executive constraints, average tenure is 13.3 (5.7) years on average for personally
resilient leaders compared to around 5.7 (4.1) years for non-resilient leaders. This is a plausible
motive for using death in o¢ ce from natural causes as a proxy for resilience. Leaders in countries
with strong executive constraints are older on average when they come to power. However, row
(8) of Table 1 shows that there is no marked di¤erence between personally resilient and non-
resilient leaders. That said, the longer tenure of leaders who die in o¢ ce means that they will on
13Specically, we add to together dummy variables denoting whether there was one of the following events
in a given country-year: extreme temperature events, oods, slides, tidal-waves, droughts, earthquakes, storms,
volcanic erruptions and wildres.
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average be older and this, in turn, makes it important to control for age and tenure when looking
for di¤erentials in institutional change when personally resilient leaders hold power.
Rows (9) through (13) consider educational attainment. Although we see little di¤erence across
strong and weak executive constraints, personally resilient leaders are on the whole less educated.
In fact, this is the case regardless of educational category. This is why we also present results
that hold constant leader educational attainment.
Leaders under weak executive constraints are more likely to come from a military background.
Moreover, this varies systematically between leaders who do and dont die in o¢ ce from natural
causes (row (14)). Rows (15) through (20) suggest little in the way of occupational di¤erences
between leaders depending on whether or not they are personally resilient. As expected, row (20)
shows that personally resilient leaders are more likely to be monarchs. Moreover, monarchs are
more common with weak executive constraints.
Our next measures look at indicators of social class, which following a common approach in
sociology is measured by the occupation of the leaders father. Specically, we use a four-way
classication to indicate the class of the leader, ranging from "underclass" to "upper class" in
rows (21) through (24). These too show little di¤erence across institutions and whether a leader
is personally resilient.
Next, we look at the leaders mode of entry into o¢ ce. As row (25) shows, personally resilient
leaders are less likely to have been elected than non-resilient ones. Row (26) shows that personally
resilient leaders are more likely to be selected by hereditary succession. But there is no di¤erence
(row (26)), in terms of whether they came into power in a (post-) colonial transition. There also
appears to be no di¤erence in terms of their being selected through autocratic means, via some
oligarchical group as a military junta (row 28)).
Finally, inspecting the country characteristics in rows (29)-(39), there is strong evidence that
the history of executive constraints is correlated with contemporary constraints. However, this
history does not have any marked correlation with the likelihood that a country has personally
resilient leaders. As expected, strong executive-constraint countries are richer (relative to the
US) than their weak executive-constraint counterparts. But there is little di¤erence in income
depending on whether the leader is personally resilient, at least under weak executive constraints.
Finally, the distribution across geographic regions is reasonably similar across countries in terms
of whether or not leaders are personally resilient.
4.3 Econometric specication
Referring to Proposition 1, we have no direct measures of e in the theory. However, we can
postulate that this multiplicative variable has some distribution, with c.d.f. F . The specic
timing comes from the theory institutional transitions (i;t+1) take place in period t in response
to ex-ante expected (group and leader) turnover (Qt) in that period, which in turn depends on
resilience, as determined by the type of leader and the type of circumstances (natural disaster or
not) inherited from the previous period (ri;t 1):
Suppose then that country i has a leader with resilience ri;t 1 entering period t. Then, the
model predicts a reduced-form relation, where the conditional probability (likelihood) of observing
strong executive constraints in the next period is given by:
Pi;t = Prob

 =
1  e
 (1  e) : ri;t 1

= 1  F (Q (ri;t 1)) :
Observe that this is decreasing in r i.e., a group whose leader has higher resilience has a lower
probability of introducing strong executive constraints. This suggests running a reduced-form
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regression:
i;t+1 = 

i + 

t + ri;t 1 + !
Ai;t 1 + "i;l;t (3)
where

i ; 

t
	
and country and year e¤ects and the control vector Ai;t contains other character-
istics of the leader in o¢ ce in country i at date t; or (time-varying) characteristics of country i.
We expect  < 0, i.e. a resilient leader implies a negative e¤ect on the reform probability.
This reduced form is made up from two structural equations:
Pi;t = 1  F (Qi;t) and Qi;t = Q (ri;t 1) ,
where Q () is given by (1). In words, the probability of a reform towards strong executive
constraints, Pi;t, is a function of the probability that the incumbent group is replaced. While
we do not have an exclusion restriction, we will also estimate separately these two relationships,
which are the core of the mechanism in the theoretical model.
The rst of these is:
qi;t = 
q
i + 
q
t + pi;t 1 + 1fi;t 1 + 2fi;t 2 + !
qAi;t 1 + i;t (4)
where fqi ; qtg are country and year e¤ects, pi;t 1 is personal resilience, and fi;t 1 and fi;t 2 are
ag resilience in any of the two past periods.14 We expect  > 0 and 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 in the
turnover equation. We also expect:
i;t+1 = 

i + 

t + qi;t + !
Ai;t 1 + "i;t: (5)
where qi;t is the probability that leader l in country i at date t leaves o¢ ce and where

i ; 

t
	
are
country and year e¤ects.15 We expect  > 0 under strong executive constraints. When estimating
the standard errors

"i;t; i;t
	
in (5) and (4) we cluster at the country level, allowing for arbitrary
correlations over time.16
5 Resilience and Executive Constraints
We begin this section by presenting our baseline regressions results on the relation between leader
resilience and reforms of executive constraints. Then we discuss their robustness.
5.1 Baseline results
The baseline results are contained in Tables 2 and 3. The rst three columns are for country-years
under strong executive constraints and the nal three columns are for weak executive constraints.
In both tables, we include year and country xed e¤ects. Table 3 has additional controls for the
(log of) leaders tenure and leader age at entry, which are additional determinants of turnover.
This is important, as our personal resilience measure could be proxying for them.
The reduced-form results in Column (1) of Tables 2 and 3 are based on (3). The results show
no signicant correlation between personally resilient leaders and transitions from strong to weak
executive constraints. However, having a natural disaster in the previous period does seem to
14To diminish the collinearity of age and tenure, we measure a leaders age only at his entry to power.
15The sample of leaders comes from Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011). In years with multiple leaders in o¢ ce,
we focus on the leader who has been the longest in o¢ ce. Thus, a leader who lasts only 2 or 3 months is not
included.
16The results are robust to clustering at the regional level (10 regions), allowing for arbitrary correlations over
time and within regions.
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increase the probability of a transition to weak executive constraints in both tables. Column (2)
in Tables 2 and 3 indicate a signicant correlation between ag resilience and turnover in both
cases and personal resilience in Table 3. As expected, f; 1; 2g in equation (4) are all negative,
in line with their interpretation as measures of resilience. In Table 3, column (2) we nd that
older and longer serving leaders are more likely to leave o¢ ce. Our estimate of parameter  in
(5) in column (3) shows a negative and signicant correlation between turnover and a transition
from strong to weak executive constraints. Thus greater turnover increases the chances that a
country stays with strong executive constraints.
Columns (4) through (6) look at the same issues for transitions from weak to strong executive
constraints. Here, the reduced form in column (4) of Tables 2 and 3 shows a precisely estimated
negative correlation between personal resilience as well as rallying-around-the-ag resilience and
transitions to strong executive constraints. With a personally resilient leader in place, the likeli-
hood of such reform is 1 percentage point lower per year than with a non-resilient leader. With
a natural disaster, the corresponding correlation is 1.5-2 percentage points. These are large num-
bers, given the reform activity which took place over the period of our data. To see this, note that
there were 88 reforms towards strong executive constraints in our 6,486 country-year observations
from 1875 to 2004 i.e., the unconditional probability of reform is about 0.013. Our estimated
coe¢ cients are thus on the same order of magnitude as this unconditional probability.
Column (5) parallels column (3) and shows a negative and signicant correlation between
resilience and turnover. As in column (3) of Table 2, we nd that older and longer-serving
leaders are more likely to leave o¢ ce in any given year. Column (6) shows, in line with the
theoretical prediction, that higher turnover is associated with a higher probability of a reform
towards strong executive constraints. The estimated coe¢ cient is quite precisely estimated.17
Taken together, the results in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with a structural interpretation
of the evidence, in line with our model. A country with weak executive constraints ruled by a
leader with greater resilience due to personal characteristics or circumstance is less likely to
introduce strong executive constraints, an e¤ect which runs through lower expected turnover.18
5.2 Robustness
In this subsection, we explore the robustness of the baseline ndings in Tables 2 and 3, always
conditioning on having weak executive constraints. We rst look at the sensitivity of the results to
each of our two measures of resilience, and to permitting longer lags in the ag-resilience measure.
Then, we test whether the estimates are robust to personal characteristics of the leader, and to
economic and political conditions. We also break the estimation sample into sub-periods, and
change the denition of the dependent variable. The results from these robustness checks appear
in Tables 4-8.
Measures of resilience Table 4 varies the way in which we include the resilience measures in
the analysis. In columns (1) and (2), we use only the leaders personal resilience. The estimates
are very similar to the corresponding specications in columns (4) and (5) of Tables 2 and 3. In
column (3), we look only at the two ag-resilience variables. Once again the results are similar to
the estimates in Tables 2 and 3. Columns (5) and (6) explore whether our chosen lag structure for
ag resilience makes sense by allowing for ve lags instead of two. The results show convincingly
17Since tenure and turnover are negatively correlated, this suggests, in line with theory that leaders with longer
tenure are less likely to introduce strong executive constraints.
18In an e¤ort to rule out reverse causation, we have looked at whether there is an empirical relationship between
being a personally resilient leader and having executive constraints being tightened while a leader is in o¢ ce,
nding no signicant correlation.
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that only the rst and second period lags are robustly correlated with turnover and transitions in
executive constraints.
Leader characteristics and income The main idea of the paper is that resilience a¤ects
institutional reform due to its implications for expected turnover. But perhaps other measurable
characteristics of leaders change also following the death (or entry) of a personally resilient leaders
or after a natural disaster, and it is these other characteristics that drive institutional reform. It
would also be problematic if natural disasters were to trigger large changes in the countrys relative
income with the resultant economic malaise making reforms towards strong executive constraints
less likely. Table 5 explores these issues by including leader characteristics and GDP (relative to
the Us) as additional controls.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 5 ask whether the results are robust to adding three sets of leader
characteristics as controls, namely educational qualications (ve categories), occupational back-
ground (eight categories), and social class (four categories). We focus on these characteristics
because we have been able to collect data for a long enough time period (their means appear in
Table 1). The main ndings from earlier tables are robust.19 Columns (4)-(6) focus on the ag-
resilience variables and controls for a countrys GDP level relative to the US (from the Maddison
data set), nding once again that the baseline results are robust.
Finally, in columns (7)-(9), we include both the leader characteristics and the relative GDP
together with the two measures of resilience. These results parallel those in columns (4)-(6) of
Tables 2 and 3. Once again, the main results are robust.20
Political context Table 6 includes two additional sets of variables to check if our results are
robust to political context and political history. In columns (1)-(3), we add categorical variables
for the mode of entry of the current leader: election, inheritance, imposition by a colonial power,
or some other form of entry. If the entry modes were systematically di¤erent for resilient and
non-resilient leaders, and assassinated with di¤erent likelihoods of reform, this might drive our
earlier results. However, we obtain very similar estimates to those in earlier tables.21
Resilient and non-resilient leaders could conceivably enter at di¤erent points in a countrys
political history. Specically, suppose that personally resilient leaders are more likely to appear
early on, when the country has little or no experience with strong executive constraints, and that
such experience promotes future reforms into this regime. This channel is in the spirit of Persson
and Tabellinis (2009) analysis of democratic capital. However, including the proportion of years
with strong executive constraints in a countrys history in columns (4)-(6), along with the mode of
entry, suggests that this is not the case. Again, the estimates are almost identical to the baseline
estimates in Tables 2 and 3.
Estimation period Columns (1)-(6) in Table 7 display the results when we estimate the base-
line specication, while splitting the sample before and after World War II. We would expect the
smaller sample sizes to blow up the standard errors. Nonetheless, we nd that our core results
more or less hold up in each subsample, with very similar estimates to the baseline ndings in
columns (4)-(6) in Tables 2 and 3.
19It is also worth noting that the sample size in this case is lower than in the baseline estimates due to data
availability.
20In two Appendix tables, available from the authors, we show that there are essentially no systematic correlations
between our resilience measures and available leader characteristics: educational attainment, social class and
occupation. This suggests that resilience is not proxying for these observable features of leaders.
21Table A3 gives the coe¢ cients on the mode of entry variables where autocratic entry is the omitted category.
None of the dummy variables representing modes of entry is signicantly di¤erent from autocratic entry.
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Measuring executive constraints We have used a specic cut-o¤ for strong executive con-
straints. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 test the robustness of this by using a di¤erent denition
with a less demanding cuto¤ (a value of 4 rather than 5 on the 7-point scale for the "xconst"
variable). Once again, the core results from Tables 2 and 3 remain robust.
Method of estimation In columns (3)-(5) of Table 8, we estimate the core specications
with a xed-e¤ect logit model rather than a linear-probability model. The sign pattern and the
signicance levels of the resilience variables on executive constraints and turnover remain robust.
This alternative model continues to nd a positive relationship between turnover and reforms
towards strong executive constraints.
Columns (6)-(8) report results from estimating the model using the full sample (strong or
weak executive constraints), but allowing the resilience e¤ects to vary depending on initial type
of executive constraints. We would thus expect higher resilience to reduce the probability of
a shift to strong executive constraints from weak executive constraints. This is indeed what
we nd in column (6) of Table 8. We get the opposite sign for countries with initial strong
constraints, so there is more persistence of strong constraints when leaders are resilient. The
coe¢ cient on the level of executive constraints in column (6) is consistent with strong persistence
in executive constraints. The results in column (7) suggest that countries with weak executive
constraints tend to have higher turnover. Column (7) also gauges the correlation between turnover
and adopting/retaining strong executive constraints. The coe¢ cient for resilience on turnover is
signicant only when executive constraints are weak. Column (8) shows that for initially weak
executive constraints, there is a positive correlation between turnover and strong constraints,
whereas the opposite is true with initially strong constraints.
Summary Overall, the ndings in Tables 4 through 8 suggest that the baseline results in Tables
2 and 3 are robust. First, they are consistent with the theoretical mechanism, which predicts a
negative e¤ect of leader resilience on expected political turnover. Both measures of resilience
whether a leader survives to dies in o¢ ce or experiences natural disasters during his tenure 
reduce turnover. Second, the results suggest that turnover is positively correlated with a transition
to strong executive constraints. These results are robust to ways of measuring resilience as well
as to including a range of controls including leader characteristics and/or country circumstances.
The relationships between resilience, turnover, and executive constraints are not only statistically
robust, but quantitatively signicant: when a resilient leader is not replaced after having died in
o¢ ce, the annual probability of reform towards strong executive constraints doubles.
Alternative interpretations We have interpreted our empirical results in terms of a theoreti-
cal model, which highlights how resilience might drive institutional change. But it bears remarking
that there are other potential explanations of the results. In particular, our theoretical idea of a
causal e¤ect from resilience to institutional change may be reversed.
Suppose that executive constraints were tightened for some other reason than resilience and
at the same time such reforms also make it harder for a leader to hold on to power. Then,
leaders in o¢ ce when constraints are tightened would be less likely to stay in o¢ ce and would
hence appear less resilient. However, in the next section we will show that there is no systematic
increase in openness when personally resilient leaders are in o¢ ce.
In terms of ag resilience, natural disasters could usher in periods of lawlessness (real, or alleged
by the government), which create an excuse for keeping the government relatively unconstrained.
Although we have shown that our results are robust to including the level of national income
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(which might su¤er during a period of lawlessness), we cannot rule out this interpretation of why
natural disasters matter for institutions.
6 Leader Resilience and Openness
Our theoretical approach is specic to executive constraints, and we have therefore maintained a
focus on this institutional reform in the empirical analysis. A good deal of the political-economics
literature on reform to date, in particular Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006), has focused
on the determinants of franchise extension.22 In our framework, we can think about such an
extension as a reform that makes access to power more open and contestable. In this section, we
show that leader resilience does not have a clear-cut theoretical prediction for reforms towards
greater openness. Moreover, there is no distinct pattern in the data. Hence, in line with what we
expect from the approach, it is specic to a particular dimension of institutional change.
Modeling openness We extend the previous model, allowing incumbents to choose the degree
of openness for recruitment to o¢ ce next period. This a¤ects political stability as it decreases
the chance that any particular group will hold onto power. We also add a cost of holding on to
power when institutions are not fully open.
Specically, suppose  2 [0; 1] is a choice variable that a¤ects openness, where  = 1 means
complete openness (free and fair elections) and  = 0 complete closedness (e.g., leaders are only
picked from a small, entrenched elite such as in monarchy). Let   (r; ) denote the probability that
a group whose leader has resilience r survives as the incumbent, and assume that   is increasing
in r and that   < 0 and   < 0: That is, a more open system reduces the probability that an
leader survives. Let   () be the expected survival value when a new leader is chosen at random.
Keeping o¢ ce recruitment closed,  < 1; has a cost e.g., because it requires spending on security
or repressing other groups to avoid the risk of a revolution or a coup. For simplicity, this cost is
linear in  and given by [1  ] c.
As before, a within-period political shock t determines if the incumbent leader survives as the
leader of his group. Before the realization of this shock, the ex ante (unconditional) probability
that the incumbent group survives in power is given by
Q(rt 1; ) = E

z (rt 1; t)   (rt 1; ) + [1  z (rt 1; t)]   ()
	
.
The revised timing of the model is:
1. The polity starts period t with an an incumbent group It and its leader with resilience rt 1,
and inherited institutions, ft; tg ; which both bind for the current period.
2. The incumbent leader chooses policy fgt; st; btg for the current period, and political institu-
tions, ft+1; t+1g:
3. Nature determines period-t political stability shock t. If the leader survives, then his re-
silience remains the same. If not, a fresh draw determines rt.
4. Group It is replaced in power with probability 1    
 
rt; t+1

: Each opposition group has
an equal probability of taking over the executive, namely
(1  (rt;t+1))e
1 e . If a new group takes
power, the resilience of its leader is chosen at random.
22In their framework, the fear of losing power in a revolution leads an incumbent elite to extend the franchise
even though this may mean that the elite loses political power.
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Choice of openness We begin by studying the case when  is xed but the incumbent can
choose the level of openness t+1. In this situation, we can look at how the resilience of the
incumbent groups leader a¤ects the degree of openness in the next period. The optimal choice
of  solves:
 (r) = arg max

Q(r; )V I () + [1 Q(r; )]V O ()  c [1  ]	 ; (6)
where V K () is the value of entering next period with group status K = I; O and a given value
of : There is a trade-o¤ between the future probability of holding power and the present costs of
repression. The key observation is that V I ()   V O () > 0 for all  < 1 e
(1 e) ; and that this gap
is decreasing in : The rst-order condition for openness, assuming an interior solution, is:
c =  Q(r; )

V I ()  V O () : (7)
How openness depends on resilience shocks to the incumbent groups leader is ambiguous and
depends on how such shocks a¤ect the marginal gain from greater openness. That is, it depends
on the sign of Qr; which is a priori unclear. For example, if Qr > 0, then resilience and openness
are complements, i.e. d=dr > 0. So having a more resilient leader leaving o¢ ce will tend to reduce
openness. This makes sense since having a leader who is more likely to stay in power means that
the incumbent group can reduce repression costs by making the political system more open.
This ambiguity in the e¤ect of r on openness is consistent with existing theories of franchise
extension, which have tended to focus on shocks to repression costs c in our model to moti-
vate increased openness. This, for example, is the modeling approach to franchise extension in
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). In our model, an increase in c would tend to increase openness
unambiguously. The key takeaway from our analysis is that there is no clear-cut theoretical link
between the resilience of leaders, in the sense that we have specied, and the decision to increase
openness.
Evidence In Table 9, we re-estimate the core specications from Table 2, but with a di¤erent
dependent variable. Specically, we replace the indicator for strong executive constraints with
three di¤erent indicators for holding open elections. We have dened reforms of electoral institu-
tions by drawing on a variety of data sets. From Polity IV, we use two measures. One is designed
to capture the extent to which the chief executive is elected through competitive multi-party elec-
tions the "Executive recruitment" variable. Another is designed to capture whether executive
recruitment takes place in a setting where no signicant group or groups are regularly excluded
from the political process (the "Political Competition" variable). As an alternative variable to
capture open contests for power, we use an indicator of the breadth of the franchise from Prze-
worski (2009), which provides data on su¤rage rules for 187 countries between 1919 and 2000.
More details on these variables, including precise denitions, can be found in the Data Appendix.
Each pair of columns in Table 9 show the reduced-form relationship between the elections
variable and our resilience measures alongside the correlation between turnover and institutional
change. In all cases, we condition of having initially weak executive constraints. In columns
(1), (3) and (5), we nd no reduced-form correlation between increases in openness and having
a resilient leader in o¢ ce. There is a correlation between turnover and openness measured as
executive recruitment (column (2)) but not the other measures (columns (4) and (6)).
In addition to the specications reported here, we have tried a large number of alternatives,
using the subcomponents of the Polity IV measures, di¤erent cuto¤s to dene open elections, and
alternative data sets such as the one by Cheibub et al (2010).23 In no case, do we nd a signicant
23This variable is based on Przeworski et al (2000) and seeks to classify political regimes based on the notion
that for a regime to be democratic, both the executive o¢ ce and the legislative body must be lled by elections.
It is available between 1946 and 2008 for 199 countries.
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relationship between resilient leaders and open elections.
This nding is important in dispelling the idea that we are capturing a generic democra-
tization e¤ect due to increases in turnover. As we have seen, there is not a clear theoretical
reason to expect such an e¤ect and the data do not suggest it either. More generally, the ndings
conrm the importance of specicity in studying political change beyond aggregate democracy
measures. Most importantly for this paper, it gives credence to the notion that the mechanism
behind political reform is the one suggested by our core theory.
7 Concluding Comments
Understanding the forces behind institutional change is a signicant challenge in political eco-
nomics. While the prevalence of strong executive constraints has increased over time, we are not
aware of any previous research which develops and tests a specic hypothesis about the driver of
this specic dimension of reform. From a theoretical perspective, leaders with a stronghold on
power have much weaker motives to reform. Empirically, we nd that such resilient leaders are
less likely to adopt strong executive constraints, a nding which is robust to a number of di¤erent
specications and inclusion of a variety of controls. As we have seen, the estimate is quantitatively
important.
Our paper has two novel empirical aspects. First, we exploit data on death of leaders from
natural causes in a di¤erent way than previous studies, such as Jones and Olken (2005). Indeed our
analysis calls into question the idea to view the death of a leader as a natural experiment. We
think of a leaders death in o¢ ce as a prospective source of variation in leader resilience, rather
than as a random event. However, as we have shown, this interpretation yields consistent
empirical ndings. The basic idea is that leaders who manage to stay on until the grim reaper
forces them from power are di¤erent, in view of their much longer tenure. That does not imply
that leader death does not create dislocation (for good or ill) as earlier researchers have argued.
However, dying leaders may behave di¤erently throughout their tenure, as a consequence of being
more resilient. Whichever way one looks at it, leaders and their personal characteristics do matter
for political and economic outcomes.
Second, we have tested and exploited the much conjectured rally-round-the-ag e¤ect. We
nd that leaders who hold o¢ ce when natural disasters hit are more likely to survive. This
is an interesting nding in its own right. However, in the context of our paper it provides an
alternative source of exogenous variation in leader resilience, which we can use to explore our
proposed theoretical mechanism.
We have independently studied reforms of executive constraints and electoral institutions, but
only found an e¤ect of leader resilience on the former. However, an interesting idea for future
research is to model explicitly the interplay between electoral openness and executive constraints.
Our framework implies a complementarity between stronger executive constraints and greater
openness, since openness increases the prospect of a leader leaving o¢ ce, all else equal.24 This
logic suggests a possible sequencing of institutional reforms, where shocks to expected turnover
may initially lead to stronger executive constraints and then to franchise extension. It is interesting
that England, the showcase in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), introduced constraints on executive
24In terms of our model, a general approach would allow both institutional dimensions  and  to be chosen.
There are good reasons to expect a complementarity between stronger executive constraints and greater openness.
This can be seen clearly in equations (6) and (7). Stronger executive constraints narrow V I ()   V O () ; the
gap between the values of incumbency and opposition, and hence encourage greater openness, all else equal (since
Q < 0). Intuitively, as the incumbency-opposition gap diminishes, it becomes less worthwhile to incur the
costs of maintaining a closed system of executive recruitment. In the limiting case of full cohesiveness, it is never
worthwhile to reduce openness.
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(royal) power through reforms such as Magna Carta and the Glorious Revolution long before
the universal franchise.
Our paper has homed in on a specic aspect of institutional change, as a result of strategic
and forward-looking behavior. We are not claiming that a model as simple as ours can capture
the full range of complexity behind times of reform, as should be clear from the rich narratives
in our three case studies. However, the simple theory suggests an empirical regularity, which also
appears in the data. Thus the theory helps us link together what would otherwise appear to be a
range of isolated experiences. More generally, the paper emphasizes the need to look at di¤erent
aspects of institutions rather than studying aggregate democracy scores. However, it is clear that
much more needs to be done to explore the sequencing of reforms and complementarities between
specic constellations of political institutions.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
As a provisional step, it is useful to dene the indirect utility from public and private goods for
the incumbent elite and other groups:
vK () = g^ () + y + K () (T   g^ ()) for K 2 fI; Og :
where I () =
h
1
+(1 )e
i
and O () =
h

+(1 )e
i
.
Let V K (; r) be the stationary value of arriving in any period when institutions are  and the
leader has resilience r where K = I denotes being the incumbent and K = O denotes opposition.
Now dene:
W I (; r) = rV I (; r) + (1  r)E V O (; w)	
and
WO (; r) = rV O (; r) + [1  r]

e
1  eE

V I (; w)
	
+
1  2e
1  e E

V O (; w)
	
.
To prove Proposition 1, we want to solve:
^ (r) = arg max
2[0;1]

z (r)W I (; r) + [1  z (r)]E W I (; w)		 :
Observe that:
V I (; r) = vI () + 
h
z (r)W I

^ (r) ; r

+ 1  z (r)E
n
W I

^ (r) ; w
oi
and
V O (; r) = vO () + 
h
z (r)WO

^ (r) ; r

+ 1  z (r)E
n
WO

^ (r) ; z
oi
:
Using the envelope theorem:
@

z (r)W I (; r) + [1  z (r)]E W I (; w)	
@
=

0 for   1 e
(1 e)
Q (r) vI () + [1 Q (r)] vO () otherwise .
Moreover, Q (r) vI () + [1 Q (r)] vO () < 0 and Q (r) vI () + [1 Q (r)] vO () > 0 for e 
Q (r), so we only need to compare  = 0 and  = 1 e
(1 e) in this case. Moreover, given the recursive
structure, we have
z (r)W I (0; r)+[1  z (r)]E WO (0; w)	 R z (r)W I  1  e
 (1  e) ; r

+[1  z (r)]E

WO

1  e
 (1  e) ; w

as
TQ (r)
e
R T :
Solving this condition, gives the inequality stated in Proposition 1. Suppose instead that e > Q (r),
then Q (r) vI () + [1 Q (r)] vO () > 0. Moreover, this implies that e > Q (r) so that
Q (r) vI () + [1 Q (r)] vO () < T for all  2

0;
1  e
 (1  e)

:
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Using the recursive structure, we get
z (r)W I

1  e
 (1  e) ; r

+ [1  z (r)]E

WO

1  e
 (1  e) ; w

> z (r)W I (; r) + [1  z (r)]E WO (; w)	
for all  2
h
0; 1 e
(1 e)

. Thus, ^ (r) = 1 e
(1 e) ; as required. 
B Data sources and denitions
Leader Characteristics Education Graduate: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader
has a graduate degree. Source: Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)
Education College: A dummy that has value 1 if the leader has a college degree. Source:
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)
Education High: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader has a high school level education
(including a trade school or technical school). Source: Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)
Education Elementary: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader left school after elementary
school (or was privately tutored). Source: Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)
Social Class: A variable that has value a value between 1 and 4 based on the fathers job.
The description of the 4 levels classication for the social status comes from Ludwig (2002). A
value of 1 corresponds to Under-stratum (e.g., unable to keep job, bankrupt, imprisoned, enslaved,
disabled, unsteady or seasonal employment, nancially dependent on others, etc.). A value of 2
is a Lower-stratum (i.e., work for others without possessing special skills or professional training
[e.g., peasants, laborers, seamstresses, blue collar workers, minor civil servants, etc.; work for self
without many resources or employees [e.g., small farmer, vendor, small businessman, etc. ]); A
value of 3 is Middle-stratum ([i.e., special education, training, abilities required] (a) profession-
als, such as doctors, lawyers, scientists, bankers, business persons, teachers, ministers, and minor
politicians, (b) professional creative artists (painters, musicians, writers, actors) (c)business
persons or landowners with employees; A value of 4 corresponds to Upper-stratum ([i.e., estab-
lished wealth, power or social status [e.g., the movers and shakers of society; aristocracy; landed
gentry; moguls, upper crust, leaders of nations, major tribes, or political parties, etc.]) We look
for leaders father job using the following sources: Lentz. (1994, 1999); Britannica Online En-
cyclopedia, Academic Edition (http://www.britannica.com/); The Statesmans Yearbook Online
(http://www.statesmansyearbook.com/about.html); Barcelona Center for International A¤airs
Political Leaders Biographies (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/en/documentation/); and other
online sources, as well as individual biographies from Lexis-Nexis.
Occupational dummy variables are from Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)
Military: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was in the military, before holding o¢ ce.
Lawyer: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was a Lawyer, before holding o¢ ce.
Civil Servant: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was a Civil Servant, before holding
o¢ ce.
Professor or Scientist: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was a Professor or Scientist,
before holding o¢ ce.
Unskilled Worker: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was an Unskilled Worker, before
holding o¢ ce.
Business: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was in business immediately before holding
o¢ ce.
Monarch: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader is or has been part of the monarchy.
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Mode of entry:
Elected: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was elected to o¢ ce in the rst instance.
Hereditary: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was selected by hereditary succession
Colonial: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was colonial/transition selected
Other autocratic modes of entry: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was selected/appointed
by an oligarchy/junta, selected by constitutional succession or by in a military coup.
Sources: Lentz. (1994, 1999); Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Academic Edition (http://www.britannica.com/);
The Statesmans Yearbook Online (http://www.statesmansyearbook.com/about.html); Barcelona
Center for International A¤airsPolitical Leaders Biographies (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/en/documentation/);
and other online sources, as well as individual biographies from Lexis-Nexis.
Electoral Institutions To obtain a comparable sample across countries and time to the
core results, we rst look at two summary indexes in the Polity IV data for executive recruitment
and political competition, called "exrec" and "polcomp". The Executive Recruitment index has
scores between 1 and 8. According to the Polity IV codebook, it is only for a score of 8 that the
chief executive (de facto head of government) is chosen through competitive elections matching
two or more candidates from at least two major parties ... the electoral process is transparent
and its outcomes are institutionally uncertainsee Marshall and Jaggers (2010, pp. 64). We
therefore dene a baseline binary variable for enfranchised institutions, which is one if the "exrec"
score is equal to 8 and zero otherwise. Using this baseline variable, our panel has 154 reforms
since 1875. But we also try di¤erent, less demanding cuto¤ values.
The Political Competition score is coded between 1 and 10. By the codebook, only a score
of 10 captures Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political
inuence with little use of coercion. No signicant or substantial groups, issues, or types of
conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process. see Marshall
and Jaggers (2010, pp. 85). Following this coding, we dene an alternative baseline binary
variable for enfranchised institutions, which is equal to one if the "polcomp" score is equal to 10
and zero otherwise. This way, we obtain 50 reforms since 1875. Again, we try alternative cuto¤
scores.
Since these alternative Polity IV variables do not perfectly capture extensions of the franchise,
we also exploit data from other sources. Przeworski (2009) provides data on su¤rage rules for
187 countries from 1919 until 2000, which relies on detailed regional information. A necessary
condition for a franchise extension is that elections are held at least once and Przeworski (2009)
dates the changes of su¤rage rules by the time of the rst election under the new rules (not when
electoral law was passed). He maps the su¤rage (for males) onto a seven-category scale, where a
level of 1 means that the franchise permits only estate representation, while a level of 7 means
that it excludes only individuals below some minimum age, possibly combined with a residence
requirement. Based on these data, we construct a binary indicator which is equal to one when a
country has reached level 7 of franchise extension and zero otherwise.
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
 
  
Strong  
executive 
constraints 
Weak 
executive 
constraints 
Weak 
executive 
constraints 
Weak 
executive 
constraints 
Strong 
executive 
constraints 
High 
executive 
constraints 
    
    
Resilient Non-resilient Resilient 
Non-
resilient 
    
(1) High executive constraints t-1 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(2) High executive constraints 
0.983 0.012 0.003 0.015 0.987 0.982 
(4346) (6486) (1539) (4945) (479) (3867) 
      
(3) Personal Resilient 
0.110 0.235 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
(4390) (6607) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(4) Flag Resilient t-1 
0.185 0.130 0.082 0.145 0.072 0.199 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(5) Flag Resilient t-1 
0.133 0.115 0.077 0.127 0.054 0.142 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(6) Turnover 
0.266 0.130 0.068 0.150 0.143 0.281 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
Tenure and Age 
(7) Tenure 
4.255 9.431 13.333 8.234 5.702 4.076 
(4390) (6607) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(8) Age at entry 
53.818 45.163 43.070 45.806 54.370 53.750 
(4390) (6604) (1552) (5052) (484) (3906) 
      
Education 
(9) Graduate education 
0.398 0.139 0.118 0.145 0.332 0.407 
(3864) (6020) (1415) (4605) (455) (3409) 
      
(10) College education 
0.390 0.361 0.262 0.391 0.286 0.404 
(3864) (6020) (1415) (4605) (455) (3409) 
      
(11) High-school education 
0.105 0.184 0.162 0.191 0.090 0.107 
(3864) (6020) (1415) (4605) (455) (3409) 
      
(12) 
Elementary-
school 
education 
0.093 0.223 0.295 0.201 0.215 0.077 
(3864) (6020) (1415) (4605) (455) (3409) 
      
(13) Illiterate 
0.014 0.094 0.163 0.072 0.077 0.005 
(3864) (6020) (1415) (4605) (455) (3409) 
      
Occupation 
(14) Military background 
0.071 0.350 0.273 0.373 0.090 0.069 
(4016) (6136) (1419) (4717) (455) (3561) 
      
(15) Lawyer 
0.299 0.116 0.039 0.139 0.305 0.298 
(4016) (6136) (1419) (4717) (455) (3561) 
      
(16) 
Professor/ 0.128 0.099 0.101 0.098 0.095 0.132 
scientist (4016) (6136) (1419) (4717) (455) (3561) 
       
(17) Business background 
0.069 0.025 0.001 0.032 0.024 0.075 
(4016) (6136) (1419) (4717) (455) (3561) 
      
(18) Civil servant 
0.100 0.057 0.030 0.065 0.086 0.102 
(4016) (6136) (1419) (4717) (455) (3561) 
      
(19) Unskilled 
0.021 0.016 0.011 0.018 0.059 0.017 
(4016) (6136) (1419) (4717) (455) (3561) 
      
(20) Monarch 
0.050 0.202 0.369 0.152 0.101 0.044 
(4016) (6136) (1419) (4717) (455) (3561) 
      
Social Class 
(21) Underclass 
0.025 0.049 0.019 0.062 0.046 0.021 
(3137) (4879) (1445) (3434) (431) (2706) 
      
  0.196 0.256 0.237 0.264 0.146 0.204 
(22) Lower class (3137) (4879) (1445) (3434) (431) (2706) 
        
(23) Middle 
0.472 0.255 0.192 0.282 0.464 0.473 
(3137) (4879) (1445) (3434) (431) (2706) 
      
(24) Upper class 
0.307 0.440 0.552 0.393 0.343 0.301 
(3137) (4879) (1445) (3434) (431) (2706) 
      
Mode of Leader Entry 
(25) Elected 
0.842 0.255 0.159 0.285 0.739 0.854 
(3868) (5528) (1307) (4221) (429) (3439) 
      
(26) Hereditary 
0.046 0.114 0.246 0.073 0.107 0.038 
(3868) (5528) (1307) (4221) (429) (3439) 
      
(27) 0.035 0.070 0.049 0.076 0.105 0.027 
Colonial 
transition 
(3868) (5528) (1307) (4221) (429) (3439) 
      
(28) Autocratic entry 
0.096 0.343 0.285 0.361 0.149 0.090 
(3868) (5528) (1307) (4221) (429) (3439) 
      
Country Characteristics 
(29) 
Past share of 
years in high 
executive 
constraints 
0.681 0.098 0.092 0.100 0.843 0.661 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
      
 Real PPP-
adjusted GDP 
per capita 
relative to US 
0.482 
(3766) 
0.203 
(4649) 
0.211 
(1032) 
0.200 
(3617) 
0.547 
(354) 
0.475 
(3412) 
(30)       
       
(31) Sub Saharan Africa 
0.115 0.210 0.116 0.239 0.200 0.104 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(32) Middle East 
0.020 0.117 0.156 0.105 0.023 0.020 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
 
North Africa 
0.005 0.046 0.048 0.045 0.012 0.004 
(33) (4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
       
(34) Europe 
0.451 0.169 0.277 0.136 0.300 0.469 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(35) Central Asia 
0.000 0.028 0.022 0.029 0.000 0.000 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(36) East Asia and Pacific 
0.135 0.111 0.196 0.085 0.143 0.134 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(37) South Asia 
0.036 0.059 0.122 0.039 0.037 0.036 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(38) Latin America and Caribbean 
0.177 0.278 0.084 0.338 0.163 0.179 
(4390) (6615) (1552) (5055) (484) (3906) 
      
(39) North America 
0.061 
(4390) 
0.000 
(6615) 
0.000 
(1552) 
0.000 
(5055) 
0.122 
(484) 
0.053 
3906) 
      
 
Note:  See the Data appendix for sources and definitions. 
 
Table 2: Turnover and Institutional Reform (Baseline Results) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Executive 
Constraints 
 
Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak 
Dependent Variable Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 
 
0.97 
 
0.62 
 
0.97 
 
0.05 
 
0.49 
 
0.05 
       
Personal resilience 0.008 -0.027  -0.010** -0.041**  
 (0.005) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.017)  
Flag resilience (t-1) 0.012** -0.109***  -0.018*** -0.103***  
 (0.005) (0.024)  (0.006) (0.014)  
Flag resilience (t-2) -0.006 -0.060***  -0.015** -0.081***  
 (0.007) (0.021)  (0.007) (0.013)  
Turnover   -0.036***   0.065*** 
   (0.009)   (0.010) 
       
       
No. of leaders 1137 1137 1153 765 765 801 
No. of obs. 4,384 4,431 4,887 6,560 6,690 8,135 
R-squared 0.148 0.250 0.156 0.072 0.165 0.093 
       
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of 
Section 4 and the Data Appendix. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to the former: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
All regressions fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004.  
 
 
Table 3: Turnover and Institutional Reform (with Tenure and Age Controls) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Executive Constraints 
 
Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak 
Dependent Variable Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints  
Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 
 
0.97 
 
0.62 
 
0.97 
 
0.05 
 
0.49 
 
0.05 
Personal resilience 0.009 -0.043**  -0.009* -0.048***  
 (0.006) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.016)  
Flag resilience (t-1) 0.012** -0.106***  -0.018*** -0.099***  
 (0.005) (0.023)  (0.006) (0.015)  
Flag resilience (t-2) -0.005 -0.076***  -0.015** -0.079***  
 (0.007) (0.021)  (0.007) (0.013)  
Tenure  0.043**   0.018**  
  (0.018)   (0.008)  
Age at entry  0.004***   0.004***  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Turnover   -0.038***   0.066*** 
   (0.009)   (0.010) 
       
No. of leaders 1127 1127 1127 759 759 759 
No. of obs. 4,346 4,392 4,346 6,486 6,615 6,486 
R-squared 0.148 0.258 0.159 0.073 0.175 0.101 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of Section 4 and the 
Data Appendix. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to the former: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All regressions include log tenure 
of the leader, the age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Turnover and Institutional Reform (Separate Resilience Variables) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover 
       
       
Personal resilience -0.010** -0.051***     
 (0.005) (0.016)     
Flag resilience (t-1)   -0.018*** -0.100*** -0.02*** -0.093*** 
   (0.006) (0.015) (0.005) (0.014) 
Flag resilience (t-2)   -0.016** -0.080*** -0.012** -0.070*** 
   (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) 
Flag resilience (t-3)     -0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.024 
(0.015) 
Flag resilience (t-4)     -0.001* 
(0.006) 
   -0.020 
   (0.014) 
Flag resilience (t-5)     -0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
       
No. of leaders 759 759 759 759 759 759 
No. of obs. 6,486 6,615 6,486 6,615 6486 6615 
R-squared 0.069 0.1631 0.072 0.173 0.073 0.173 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of 
Section 4 and the Data Appendix. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to the former: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
All regressions include log tenure of the leader, the age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the 
period 1875-2004.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Turnover and Institutional Reform  
(Robustness to Leader Characteristics and Economic Conditions) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
          
Personal 
resilience 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.049*** 
(0.017) 
    -0.018* 
(0.010) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
 
          
Flag 
resilience 
(t-1) 
   -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.099*** 
(0.015) 
 -0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
 
          
Flag 
resilience 
(t-2) 
   -0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.077*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
 
Turnover   0.072***   0.095***   0.090*** 
   (0.015)   (0.013)   (0.020) 
          
Controls Leader 
characteristics 
Leader 
characteristics 
Leader 
characteristics 
Income Income Income Leader 
characteristics 
and income 
Leader 
characteristics 
and income 
Leader 
characteristics 
and income 
No. of 
leaders 
359 359 359 505 505 505 270 270 270 
No. of obs. 4,472 4,557 4,472 4,568 4,665 4,568 3,390 3,390 3,390 
R-squared 0.076 0.187 0.109 0.081 0.209 0.125 0.104 0.104 0.138 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of Section 4 and the Data appendix. Standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. In columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9), education of the current leader is measured by five categories (post-graduate, college, high-school or 
corresponding, elementary school, no formal education), occupation in 8 categories (military, lawyer, professor-scientist, business, civil servant, unskilled, manual worker, other), and social class of father in 4 
categories (upper/elite, middle, lower, under). Income in columns (4)-(9) is measured by the country’s PPP adjusted GDP per capita relative to the US in the current year. All regressions also include log tenure 
of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004. 
 
Table 6: Turnover and Institutional Reform (Robustness to Political Context) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
       
       
Personal resilience -0.013** -0.036**  -0.014** -0.037**  
 (0.007) (0.018)  (0.007) (0.018)  
Flag resilience (t-1) -0.019*** -0.097***  -0.018*** -0.096***  
 (0.006) (0.015)  (0.006) (0.015)  
Flag resilience (t-2) -0.016** -0.080***  -0.016** -0.079***  
 (0.007) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.013)  
Turnover   0.086***   0.086*** 
   (0.012)   (0.012) 
       
Controls Mode of 
entry 
Mode of 
entry 
Mode of 
entry 
Mode of entry 
and past 
constraints 
Mode of entry 
and past 
constraints 
Mode of entry 
and past 
constraints 
       
No. of leaders 576 576 576 576 576 576 
No. of obs.  5,401 5,522 5,401 5,401 5,522 5,401 
R-squared 0.078 0.191 0.118 0.078 0.192 0.118 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of Section 
4 and the Data appendix. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Mode of entry in 
columns (1)-(6) refers to how the current leader entered office measured by four categories (elected, inherited, colonial transition, other autocratic 
modes of entry). Past constraints in columns (4)-(6) refers to the proportion of years in the past (since 1800 or independence), in which the country 
had High executive constraints. All regressions also include log tenure of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and  
fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Turnover and Institutional Reform (Robustness to Sample Period) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Period Pre WWII Pre 
WWII 
Pre WWII Post WWII Post 
WWII 
Post WWII 
Dependent 
Variables 
Executive 
constraints 
Turnover Executive 
constraints 
Executive 
constraints 
Turnover Executive 
constraints 
       
       
Personal resilience -0.012** -0.055*  -0.013 -0.055**  
 (0.005) (0.031)  (0.009) (0.024)  
Flag resilience (t-1) -0.009** -0.220***  -0.018*** -0.096***  
 (0.004) (0.059)  (0.006) (0.015)  
Flag resilience (t-2) -0.023** 0.117  -0.016** -0.083***  
 (0.011) (0.159)  (0.007) (0.013)  
Turnover   0.019**   0.105*** 
   (0.008)   (0.016) 
       
No. of leaders 362 362 362 397 397 397 
No. of obs. 2,380 2,423 2,380 4,106 4,192 4,106 
R-squared 0.079 0.139 0.084 0.097 0.227 0.143 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of Section 
4 and the Data appendix. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All regressions also 
include the (log of) the tenure of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. Sample period varies, as 
indicated. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8: Turnover and Institutional Reform  
(Robustness to Measure of High Executive Constraint and Method of Estimation) 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable  Executive 
constraints > 4 
Executive 
constraints > 4 
 
 
Executive  
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
constraints 
Executive 
constraints 
Turnover Executive 
constraints 
Estimation method  OLS OLS  FE Logit FE Logit FE Logit OLS OLS OLS 
Personal resilience  -0.008 
(0.005) 
  -2.440*** 
(0.823) 
-0.557*** 
(0.135) 
 -0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.064*** 
(0.016) 
 
Flag resilience (t-1)  -0.021*** 
(0.007) 
  -1.043** 
(0.421) 
-1.060*** 
(0.170) 
 -0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.087*** 
(0.014) 
 
Flag resilience (t-2)  -0.017**   -0.769* -0.784***  -0.007 -0.068***  
  (0.008)   (0.426) (0.171)  (0.006) (0.011)  
Personal resilience * Strong 
Executive Constraints 
       0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
 
           
Flag resilience (t-1) * Strong 
Executive Constraints 
       0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.030 
(0.025) 
 
           
Flag resilience (t-2) *Strong 
Executive Constraints 
       -0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.017 
(0.022) 
 
           
Turnover   0.070***    2.671***   0.060*** 
   (0.011)    (0.293)   (0.009) 
Turnover * Strong Executive 
Constraints 
         -0.092*** 
(0.013) 
Strong Executive 
Constraints at (t-1) 
       0.913*** 
(0.008) 
0.077*** 
(0.020) 
0.934*** 
(0.007) 
No. of leaders  721 721     1886 1886 1902 
No. of observations  6,276 6,276  3,486 6,585 3,486 10,832 11,007 10,832 
R-squared  0.079 0.106     0.945 0.219 0.947 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of Section 4 and the Data appendix. In columns 
(1) and (2), the boundary between strong and weak executive constraints is (weakly) greater than 4, rather than 5, on the 7-degree scale for “xconst”. In columns (3)-(5) we use fixed effect 
logit model. In columns (6)-(8) we use all ample and interact resilience variables and turnover with a dummy for high executive constraints (High executive constraints (t-1)) (state 
dependence model). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All regressions also include log tenure of the leader, age of the 
leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. Sample period varies, as indicated. 
Table 9: Turnover and Electoral Reforms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Exrec8 Exrec8 Polcomp10 Polcomp10  Przeworsky Przeworsky 
       
       
Personal resilience -0.007  0.004  0.013  
 (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.038)  
Flag resilience (t-1) -0.019  0.001  -0.012  
 (0.015)  (0.002)  (0.015)  
Flag resilience (t-2) -0.015  0.001  -0.007  
 (0.014)  (0.002)  (0.015)  
Turnover  0.038***  0.001  -0.003 
  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.013) 
       
No. of leaders 734 734 759 759 724 724 
No. of obs. 6,425 6,425 6,486 6,486 5,403 5,403 
R-squared 0.406 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.742 0.742 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are alternative indicators for open elections, defined in the text of Section 6 and the Data Appendix. Standard errors clustered 
by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All regressions also include log tenure of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as 
well fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL TABLES: 
 
 
Table A1: Leader characteristics and Resilience 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable College 
graduate 
High 
school 
Elementary 
School 
No formal 
education/ 
illiterate 
Under 
class 
Lower 
class 
Middle 
class 
Upper 
class 
         
Personal resilience 0.006 -0.060 0.054 -0.000 0.029 0.055 -0.034 -0.050 
 (0.076) (0.052) (0.059) (0.048) (0.029) (0.051) (0.058) (0.061) 
Flag resilience (t-1) -0.011 -0.011 0.023 -0.001 -0.023 -0.022 0.005 0.040 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026) 
Flag resilience (t-2) 0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.012 -0.028* -0.007 0.008 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.029) (0.028) (0.025) 
         
         
No. of leaders 665 665 665 665 430 430 430 430 
No. of obs. 6,007 6,007 6,007 6,007 4,902 4,902 4,902 4,902 
R-squared 0.520 0.458 0.451 0.521 0.606 0.590 0.558 0.658 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for level of education and social class as indicated. These are defined in the text and the Data appendix.                  
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. In columns (1)-(4) , education of the current leader                  
is measured by five categories (post-graduate and college, high-school or corresponding, elementary school, no formal education), and social class of                 
father in 4 categories (upper/elite, middle, lower, under). All regressions also include log tenure of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed                  
country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Leader Characteristics and Resilience 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable Military Lawyer Professional 
Scientist 
Business Civil 
Servant 
Unskilled Monarch 
        
Personal resilience 0.051 -0.024 -0.013 -0.019** -0.052 -0.031 -0.015 
 (0.061) (0.025) (0.037) (0.009) (0.032) (0.024) (0.046) 
Flag resilience (t-1) 0.027 -0.010 -0.022* 0.007 -0.012 -0.018** 0.027* 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) 
Flag resilience (t-2) 0.020 0.004 -0.022 0.003 -0.011 -0.011 0.008 
 (0.028) (0.017) (0.014) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) 
        
No. of leaders 717 717 717 717 717 717 717 
No. of obs. 6,121 6,121 6,121 6,121 6,121 6,121 6,121 
R-squared 0.455 0.388 0.547 0.291 0.420 0.324 0.782 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for occupation, as indicated. These are defined in the text and the Data appendix. Standard errors clustered by country in 
parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Occupation is measured by 8 categories (military, lawyer, professor-scientist, business, civil servant, 
unskilled, manual worker, other). All regressions also include log tenure of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample 
is for the period 1875-2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Turnover and Institutional Reform (Robustness to Context) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
Executive 
Constraints 
Turnover Executive 
Constraints 
       
Personal resilience -0.013** -0.036**  -0.014** -0.037**  
 (0.007) (0.018)  (0.007) (0.018)  
Flag resilience (t-1) -0.019*** -0.097***  -0.018*** -0.096***  
 (0.006) (0.015)  (0.006) (0.015)  
Flag resilience (t-2) -0.016** -0.080***  -0.016** -0.079***  
 (0.007) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.013)  
Turnover   0.086***   0.086*** 
   (0.012)   (0.012) 
Elected -0.005 0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.007 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.007) 
Hereditary 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) 
Colonial 0.007 0.037 0.005 0.006 0.033 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.028) (0.010) (0.011) (0.028) (0.010) 
Past constraints    -0.039 -0.149** -0.030 
    (0.047) (0.072) (0.044) 
Controls Mode of Entry Mode of 
Entry 
Mode of Entry Mode of entry & past 
constraints 
Mode of entry & past 
constraints 
Mode of entry & past 
constraints 
No. of leaders 576 576 576 576 576 576 
No. of observations 5,401 5,522 5,401 5,401 5,522 5,401 
R-squared 0.078 0.191 0.118 0.078 0.192 0.118 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of Section 4 and the Data 
appendix. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Mode of entry in columns (1)-(6) refers to how the 
current leader entered office measured by four categories (elected, inherited, colonial transition, other autocratic modes of entry). Past constraints in columns (4)-(6) 
refers to the proportion of years in the past (since 1800 or independence), in which the country had High executive constraints. All regressions also include log tenure 
of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004. 
